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ABSTRACT
THE PLACE OF THE PHILOSOPHER
February 1986
Jeffrey Barja Diamond, B.A. U.C. Berkeley
M.A., University of Massachusetts
Directed by Professor N. Xenos
The text of this essay falls in three sections, and is chiefly
organized around a discussion of the development, consequences, and
legitimacy of three notions, or understandings, which have profoundly
shaped reflective and philosophical inquiry. Put briefly, these
understandings are: that the use and meaning of our concepts are
essentially determined by general principles or rules; that cultural
conventions, because they are artifacts, are consequently "artificial"
--indifferent or opposed to what is genuine and true; and that the
purpose and role of the mind and language is to correctly represent
to us the objects of the world.
In the first section we shall examine individually the appearance
of these notions in Greek antiquity. In the second section, we look
at their re-emergence or reinvigoration as a part of the intellectual
shift occurring in the early modern era, and at a subsequent analysis
and critique by Hegel of the self-understanding in which they each
play a role. In the third section, as in the first two, attention is
given to the consequences of these understandings--fostering
intellectual isolation, elitism, and paradox. But in this final
section, the analysis and critique is carried further with the help of
the philosophical perspective of Ludwig Wittgenstein.
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chapter I
INTRODUCTION
Reflection necessarily both presupposes and entails a certain
degree of detachment. It involves a kind of "stepping back" to view
things differently from how we do when we are going about the business
of our lives. During the course of our cultural history, the practice
of reflecting has been constituted and shaped in particular ways. One
result of some of these ways is that sometimes that "step back" looks
more like a chasm separating the thinker and the world he lives in.
And as a consequence, the vastness of this distance may undermine the
usefulness of that view which reflection was meant to provide.
This essay will attempt to sketch the development and conse-
quences of chiefly three conceptions, which together have profoundly
shaped the tradition of Western philosophical thought. Finally, in
the third section, the legitimacy of these understandings will be
explored with the help of insights largely derived from the thought
of Ludwig Wittgenstein.
1
chapter II
DISCUSSION I
Aristotle describes the experience of "wonder that things are
as they are" as the beginning of philosophy.'' The historical origin
of philosophy is often considered the speculations of the Ionian
nature philosophers
.of the 6th century B.C. Prior to this time it
seems people did not so much offer what we might call "rational
explanations," but rather mythological ones. According to Sheldon
Wolin, before the nature philosophers, "men were concerned not with
'how' things operated but what superhuman agency was directing
them." It is probably possible to overstate the distinctness of
"pre and post-philosophical" thought; but this does not belie the
occurrence of an important shift.
The objects of speculation and discussion by the nature philoso-
phers were often such things as fire, water, earth, and air. They
were interested here not in this or that fire, or this or that piece
of earth--the specific entities which one comes across in one's
non-intellectual or philosophical encounters with the world. They
spoke of general entities, and it is this sort of entity which serves
as the object of inquiries asking, for instance, "what is the nature
of . " That is, these general concepts had their place not
in the everyday experience which dealt with particular fires and such,
but in those activities reflecting a speculative or philosophical
attitude.
2
3Just as such intellectual practices as considering the nature,
causes, dangers, uses, etc. of fire (in general) are familiar to us,
so the general concepts which are part of these practices are naturally
also familiar. But this may not always have been so. Bruno Snell
argues that the linguistic construction used to express a general
concept in Greek only came into use after the writing of the Homeric
epics. This construction consists of a singular definite article in
conjunction with a noun, adjective, or verb in the infinitive. Thus
for instance the article followed by the noun hydor is translated
by the general concept "water".
According to Snell, the generic article does not appear in Homer,
nor even yet in Hesiod. For instance, whereas Plato employs the
generic article in speaking of "justice", Hesiod uses the plural of the
article and noun--suggesting to Snell a meaning like "the series of
individual just acts."^ Similarly Snell claims that the constructions
in Homer suggest that ancient thought had no general concept: "the
horse in Homer is never the concept of a horse (the notion of that
r
animal as a species), but always a particular horse." The extent
to which general concepts do appear in early Greek writing is in the
form of personifications. Thus "fear" ( phobos ) is represented as a
demon.
Some classicists have voiced skepticism about what sort of
conclusions can be made from the linguistic evidence which Snell
interprets. The fact that the Greeks may not have had words for
general concepts does not preclude the possibility that they could
still conceive in that manner. As Snell himself shows, Cicero
4expressed general concepts circuitously in Latin which had no
specific formulations for general concepts.^ But it is significant
that no such circuitous constructions seem to appear in early Greek,
and it would be difficult to deny that Snell is on to something about
the conceptual-linguistic development which fostered not only the
Ionian nature philosophies, but subsequent philosophical speculation
as well.
Among subsequent philosophers, Socrates is often credited with a
role in the history of ethics analogous to that which the Ionian
philosophers played in the history of nature philosophy. According to
the account in the Phaedo
,
as a young man Socrates undertook the study
of Anaxagoras' philosophy, but found its "scientific" and naturalistic
approach unsatisfying. For Socrates the important questions concerned
the purpose and meaning of all the things in the universe--he sought
to discover "what is best for each and what is the universal good."^
Futhermore, by discussing the ethical notions which men lived by
without recourse to mythological authority, Socrates set ethical
speculation and inquiry on a new footing. According to Cicero and
others, Socrates' greatest achievement was that he brought philosophy
down "from heaven to earth", and to the everyday life of men.^ Hegel
excoriates these later philosophers insofar as they thus construe
Socrates' philosophy as a "domestic or fireside philosophy, which
conforms to all the ordinary ideas of men."^*^ In truth, it was only
because Socrates did bring speculation and inquiry down to earth and
and everyday life that he succeeded in challenging the accepted wisdom
of his time.
5Socrates' method consists of inducing another to pose a claim as
to the nature of courage or friendship or some such thing-thereby
supplying the "material" for the philosophic exercise-, Socrates then
applies himself to this material by questioning and probing. Socrates
typically begins the discussion by directing his interlocutor in a
manner similar to that seen in the following passage from the
Euthyphro. Euthyphro is seeking to prosecute his father for the
death of a servant. Since Socrates is himself present at the court
to answer charges of impiety, he asks Euthyphro for a definition so
that he may "have it to turn to, and use as a standard whereby to
judge your actions and those of other men."^' Their discussion
continues
:
Soc: I suppose that piety is the same in all actions, and that
impiety is always the opposite of piety, and retains its
identity, and that, as impiety, it always has the same
character which will be found in whatever is impious.
Euth: Certainly, Socrates, I suppose so.
Soc: Tell me, then, what is piety and impiety?
However, after Euthyphro's response, Socrates directs him again:
Soc: ...please try to give a more definite answer to the question
which I asked you just now. What I asked you, my friend, was,
what is piety? and you have not explained it to me to my
satisfaction. You only tell me that what you are doing now,
namely, prosecuting your father for murder is a pious act.
Euth: Well, that is true Socrates.
Soc: Very likely. But many other actions are pious, are they not,
Euthyphro?
Euth: Certainly.
6Soc: Remember, then, I did not ask you to tell me one or two of all
characteristir ^ what isc of piety which makes all pious actions pious. 12
Here, and in a number of other dialogues, Socrates introduces
the general concept into ethical discussion: in order to know what
piety is, one must know what it is "itself," i.e. not just instances
of it. Since Socrates this notion has become part of our common
stock of understandings. But the consistent difficulty which Euthyphro
and others have in grasping Socrates' meaning in this respect suggests
that this way of putting things, and the intellectual practice it
corresponds to, was not yet familiar to Socrates' contemporaries.
In fact, Euthyphro's response was in a sense an appropriate one
within the context of a more traditional Greek ethical discourse.
This traditional ethical discourse consisted not of teaching by
definitions, but by examples--of which the poets offered many.^^
However, the "language game", as Wittgenstein might say, that Socrates
introduces is of a different sort: it invites its participants to
search themselves and attempts to systematical ly formulate what it is
they believe, and then exposes this formulation to criticism--or
better put--to guided self-criticism.
In this way the socratic practice of philosophy represented an
important and valuable tool in achieving greater self-awareness.
But in so doing Socrates postulated a theoretical knowledge (even if
not for mere mortals) above and beyond the knowledge of particular,
practical applications. And as we shall see, this eventually proves
to be a problematic postulation.
7In that early
"mythological era" of Greek history. It appears
that people did not conceive of custom as something "merely conven-
tional", and conceptually opposed to nature. As Wolin says.
Prior to the development of Greek philosophy In the slvthcentury B.C., man had thought of himsel? a d Sc^etv If
contlnffu formed a
Or as F.M. Cornford puts it: "custom and nature were at one."^^
Even for the nature philosophers the conceptual boundaries appear quite
different from our own, and later, thought. For instance, for
Anaximander, the principle of disruption in human affai rs-adi ke,
often translated as "injustice"-is also the principle of change in the
natural world. Heraclitus likens a law of the universe to the law of
the city, hence expressing both a commonality, but clearly also a
conceptual distinctness. Moreover, he claims, "all human laws are
nourished by one, which is divine," and thus envisions human laws as
subordinate and derivative of a higher law which orders the
universe. ^ ^
The Greek word here translated "law"— nomos
--also has the sense
"custom", and in the hands of sophists the relationship of subordina-
tion of human laws and customs to a divine and natural law is trans-
formed into a relationship of antagonism and contradiction. For
instance, Plato has Hippias say "law ( nomos ) the tyrant of men forces
many things through against nature." Antiphon himself says, "Most
of the prescriptions of law are hostile to nature. Even before the
Hellenistic era, growing cosmopolitanism not only shook the faith in
parochial customs, but brought into question the legitimacy of custom
8Itself. Similarly, the frequent alteration and repeal of laws during
the classical era undermined the legitimacy of law as such; for this
reason Aristotle considered it better for a state to maintain its laws,
rather than constantly change them-even if the changes themselves
were each improvements.^^
In the Republic and the Gorgias, the one thing which Socrates and
Thrasymachus or Callicles agree on is that what justice really is, has
nothing to do with custom or human convention. Callicles, for instance,
charges Socrates with entangling his interlocutors with the mere
convention of justice. Only he himself is willing to say what others
only think-shed the cultural hypocrisy and escape the grip of society,
which keeps them from the truth, namely that, "both among all animals
and in entire states and races of mankind it is plain that... right is
recognized to be the sovereignty of the stronger over the weaker.
But for Plato the truth is not to be found in the natural, any
more than in the conventional. Plato appears to give his account of
the discovery of truth in the "allegory of the cave." The allegory
describes a scene in which a collection of men have been chained
since childhood in a cave in such a way that they are unable to move
their heads and look around. Their gaze is fixed straight ahead,
opposite the entrance of the cave. Behind them burns a fire. Between
them and the fire is a parapet, like that which puppeteers use to hide
themselves while they manipulate the puppets sticking up over the top.
Socrates asks his audience to imagine "persons carrying along
various artificial objects, including figures of men and animals in
9wood or stone or other materials, which project over the parapet.
The inhabitants of the cave see nothing of these figures but the
shadows on the cave wall in front of them, and hear only the echoes.
Consequently, men so chained would recognize nothing but the shadows
of those artificial objects.
Now one of the prisoners is set free, and made to face what had
been behind him. He is unaccustomed to the light of the fire: his
eyes hurt and he cannot see clearly. But eventually his sight adjusts
and he comes to realize that what we had previously taken to be the
truth were only shadows.
He is then forced up out of the cave--out of the faint light
of the fire into the bright light of day. Again he is blinded, but
again his eyes adjust. Now for the first time he is able to see the
objects of the "real" world; then he turns his eyes to the sky, and
finally he is able to view the sun itself.
Let us now interpret the allegory. Within the cave is to be
found human society and its products; this is a world populated by
men, and their creations— those "artificial objects" of wood and
stone and such. But most men do not even see these things; the
misdirection of their thinking chains them to a view of only the
shadows of these things. Thus, for instance, Callicles does not even
see what "human justice" is--that artifact of the cave; he sees only
its shadow, and so misperceives even the world of merely human law and
convention.
But the prisoner in the allegory is not allowed to stop at the
point of gaining a true view of what is there in the cave. He is forced
10
to leave that realm of "artificial objects" and the light of the man-
It is only upon leaving the human community of the cave
that the philosopher sees real things-not mere representations-in
the true light. Socrates is explicit that the naturalism of this
realm of truth is only metaphorical. The truth is not to be found in
Physical nature, but in the invisible and purely intellectual world of
ideas or "forms."
The picture of the philosophical enterprise given in the allegory
of the cave is one in which the philosopher must cut himself loose
from the thinking of his community and climb up out of society and
custom, if he is to see the true nature of things. So, as it was for
Callicles, here too the philosopher must free himself of his society's
hold on him and its conventions and artifice. At least since Plato's
time, this notion that philosophy must penetrate not only beyond
conventional understandings, but beyond convention itself, has been a
commonplace in Western intellectual history. Two results of this
entrenched understanding appear to have been a tendency to reinforce
philosophers' sense of alienation from their cultures, and a tendency
to preclude inquiry into just what sort of truth conventions might be
found to have.
The word which is commonly translated as "true", and is used in
reference to the successive stages in the allegory of the cave--that of
shadows, of firelight and artificial objects, and of daylight and real
objects--is in the Greek al ethes . It appears in the normal attributive.
11
comparative, and superlative forms corresponding with the stages of the
allegory. The word consists of a prefix indicating negation, and a
stem related to a verb normally translated something like "to escape
the notice of." Hence Heidegger suggests as a more appropriate trans-
lation "unhidden": he thus characterizes the stages as concerning
"the unhidden", "more unhidden", and "most unhidden". And for Heideg-
ger, what is most significant in the allegory of the cave is a
Shift in the meaning of aletheia--''unhiddenness"
The allegory of the cave is the story of the philosopher coming
in closer and closer contact with the unhidden, until finally he
leaves the cave. Outside the cave he eventually traces back to the
source of the light which makes possible his vision. As Socrates
explains, the sun is meant to represent the "idea of the Good." The
word here translated "good" ( agathon ) , does not so much mean "morally
upright", but rather "useful" or "fi tti ng"--the "idea of the Good" is
what gives things their meaning and use.^^ The idea of the Good is a
standard by which the philosopher may judge the conduct and actions
of those back in the world of the cave, for it is what "anyone who is
going to act rationally either in public or private affairs must have
26
sight of." It gives "unhi ddenness to what is known and the ability
71
(to know) to him who knows," and is "itself master, dispensing both
unhiddenness
. . .and the ability to perceive." According to Heidegger
this represents a philosophical and ontological supplanting of the
original notion and experience of aletheia : "truth no longer is, as
unhiddenness, the basic feature of being itself.
12
This should become more clear as we consider the last part of
the allegory of the cave. After having been brought out of the cave,
and after having viewed real objects and the sun, the former prisoner
returns to the cave, where he may try to enlighten some of his fellows
as he was himself enlightened. Socrates argues that the knowledge of
the "forms"-those real objects, outside of the cave-is innate within
us, though we fail to see it. Thus the philosophical task is to get
oneself and others not to be "either turned in the wrong direction or
looking the wrong way.-^O „
fellows he must force them to turn their eyes from the wall, around to
the fire, and ultimately, up out of the cave. Hence Heidegger says
The transition from one situation into another consists in
making one s glance more correct. Everything depends on theprtho^,_ the correctness of the glance. Through this correct-
ness, seeing and recognizing become something right, so that it
eventually be directed straight ahead tothe Highest Idea, and made fast in this "straigtening-out." In
this directing of itself, perceiving is compared to what is
supposed to be sighted... In consequence.
. .an omoiosis subsists,
an agreement between recognizing and the thing itself .31
What is involved here, according to Heidegger, is a transformation
in the philosophical significance of truth. The philosopher has ceased
to orient himself by the pursuit of truth in the sense of what was
"to the Greeks the self-evident and fundamental experience of aletheia
,
OO
the unhiddenness of beings." Instead he takes the primary sense of
"truth "-- aletheia-
- to be "correctness", demoting "unhiddenness" to a
subordinate and derivative status. Thus, when aletheia is said,
oo
"
orthotes is meant and set as a standard" to rule and judge the
thought and actions of men (back in the cave). Paradoxically, what
the philosopher most seeks as truth in the sense of "unhiddenness"--
13
that which is nearest to being", i.e., most real-he then construes
as truth in the sense of correctness, agreement of word or perception
and thing, as the idea of the Good.
While the specific understanding of the "unhiddenness of beings"
is perhaps no longer a part of our modern experience, our present
notion of truth does admit of a roughly similar sense, distinct from
that of "correctness". When we speak of "a true friend", "true love",
or "true grit", we do not mean "a correct friend", "correct love",
or correct grit"; here "true" means something like "real" or
"genuine"
.
However, since Plato the understanding of truth as "correctness"
has dominated Western philosophy: "from now on the mold of the
essence of truth becomes, as the correctness of representing through
an assertion, the standard for all of Western thi nking
. Heidegger
cites Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, and Nietzsche: all agree that "truth"
is "the agreement of mental concept (or representation) with the
„35
thing." For Heidegger the significance of the philosophical trans-
formation of "truth" from "unhiddenness" to "correctness" lies in the
alienation from the world it bespeaks, "as unhiddenness truth is
still a basic feature of beings themselves. But truth as "correct-
ness" is not a feature of, nor does it refer to, beings; it only
applies to consciousness and statements. Hence the truth which the
philosopher now pursues is not a fundamental characteristic of the
world, but is rather "the label of the human attitude towards beings."^"^
And by posing the question of truth in terms of an "atti tude"--the
right direction of the mind's gaze--the philosopher does not by his
14
efforts reach anything which is a characteristic of beings them-
selves. That is, the conception of truth as "correctness" posits a
duality of consciousness and the world, its object, but refers only
to consciousness; truth construed as an orientation of consciousness
towards things, is thus essentially about consciousness, not about
things. Truth conceived exclusively as "correctness" implies a
self-referring philosophical subjectivity, locked-out and estranged
from what the things of the world are in and of themselves.
In a section of her essay "What is Authority", Arendt borrows
from Heidegger's discussion of Plato's conception of truth. But
Arendt s own contribution to this discussion consists largely of
shedding a political light on some of the issues developed by
Heidegger. According to Arendt, in a number of dialogues not
treating of political subjects, such as the Symposium
, Phaedrus
, and
even in the first books of the Republic
, the philosopher is defined not
as a pursuer of the idea of the Good, but rather of "the beautiful"
(in classical Greek it seems that "the beautiful" would be understood
as very close to truth in the sense of "unhiddenness") Furthermore,
Arendt points out that Socrates only introduces "correctness" as the
meaning of truth in the last portion of the allegory of the cave, when
the former prisoner returns to his unenlightened society. The
significance for Arendt of the transformation of the conception of
truth is that truth becomes construed as a standard and measure for
ruling the social world. It is when the philosopher is forced to
confront his society as an immediate problem that he "resorts to what
he has seen, the ideas, as standards and measures, and finally... uses
15
them as instruments of domination.
The lives of the many in the cave over whom the philosopher
envisions establishing a rule of reason "are characterized not by
contemplation, but by l^s, speech, and jirMs. action."^ This
fact is, however, contrary to the depiction in the allegory: here
what is represented as fundamental is these men's s^. And it is
with respect to their sight that they are subject to the philosopher's
"correction". Thus Arendt says, the philosopher's intrusion into
human affairs is
justified not only by an absolute priority of seeinq overdoing, of contemplation over speaking and acting but also
men human is the urge tosee Hence the interest of the philosopher Ind the interestof the man coincide; both demand that human affairs theresults of speech and action, must not acquire a dignity of
outs^d^thei^ rLlm^il"*^'*
do">ination of something
The authority of the philosopher as such to correct or govern
the proceedings of his society presupposes the subordination of those
aspects of life to philosophic knowledge and standards. As Arendt
suggests this constitutes an imposition or projection of the philosopher
upon the social world, thus entailing a systematic blindness to the
independence and dignity which that world possesses of itself.
What can be seen as emerging from the discussions by Heidegger
and Arendt is a network of mutually reinforcing or implying under-
standings and experiences. With the conception of truth as the
accurate representation in word or thought of things, we see the
isolation of the merely sel f-referring subjectivity, and consequently
the failure to attain to "what things are in themselves"; the failure
16
to see beyond "subjective projection" to what things are in themselves
ensures that the (cultural) world appears irrational and in need of
correction; and as Arendt suggests, the prospect of confronting this
cultural world may partially underlie the psychological impetus behind
construing philosophical truth as a "correctness", as a standard.
Now add to this existential and intellectual network the notion
that the meaning of a concept as sought in philosophy is a defining
principle, and as such is prior to the responsible practical use of the
concept in particular circumstances. Also add the notion that a
society's conventions are necessarily "artificial", and to be escaped
in the pursuit of truth and reality. Now we have a critical sketch
of a predicament which has characterized much of Western intellectual
thought.
chapter III
discussion II
In the previous section we looked briefly at the disruption of
what Is believed to have been a pre-phi losophical Greek experience of
continuity and Immediacy in the world. It has often been noted that
the period of transition to our modern era manifests some similarities
to that earlier time of transition; that there might be similarities
should not be surprising given the cultural overlap, and the at
least roughly parallel trends towards expanded trade and urbanization.
Michel Foucault describes the pre-modern medieval and
renaissance world-view as comprising a unified complex hierarchy of
resemblances and similitudes. He cites the renaissance thinker. Porta,
as follows:
As with respect to its vegetation the plant stands convenient
to the brute beast, so through feeling does the brutish animal
to man, who is comfortable to the rest of the stars by his
i n te 1 1 i gence i these links proceed so strictly that they appear
as a rope stretched from the first cause as far as the lowest
and smallest of things
In this world the distinction between man and nature is only one
of degree: for the overall pattern is one of continuity. In this
world the behavior of natural entities and beings is reckoned in terms
also used for human motivation and emotion. Human society represented
both an integrated part of the cosmic whole, and a microcosm of it;
divine law, natural law, and human law were linked in an ontological
hierarchy. But this cosmic hierarchy of law was eventually to be
replaced to an increasing extent by a vision of legal antagonism. The
16th century poet Greville laments the human condition in which we are
17
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"Born to one law and to another bound,
... What meaneth nature by
these diverse laws, Passion and Reason, self-division's cause.
Moreover, from approximately this time on, human society ceased
to seem continuous with, and founded upon, the cosmic order. As Wolin
suggests, "men no longer felt that the community represented a natural
unity." Hobbes' observation that "by art is created that great
Leviathan called a Commonweal th,"« merely expressed an understanding
Which other men had been acting upon for the better part of a century.
Besides positing the cosmos as a "Great Chain of Being," this
pre-modern outlook also understood the universe to consist of signs
and meanings hidden within its objects themselves; the concealed
truth of these objects was to be read or interpreted from their
appearance. Thus Crollius poses the rhetorical question, "Is it not
true that all herbs, plants, trees and other things issuing from the
bowels of the earth are so many magic books and signs?"^^ God had
written the very nature and essence of his works upon their outward
aspects. Hence, for instance, the appearance of the walnut meat
indicated that it was medicine for ailments of the brain. Moreover,
something s meaning and essence was not only given by the signs
located in its physical appearance, but also by the pertinent language
of other "texts". The entirety of recorded thought and experience of
every aspect of an object or being was essential to the definition of
what it was.
According to Foucault, learned exposition of the objects of the
natural world took the form of what were known as "histories":
19
“"ipletely unitary
co5fAr^iv;ir;s!"iSenE?r
HiSiir-
the to
i^s -
t^the mV?" connected it
Thus, for instance one chapter of Aldrovandis' Historia
serpentum et draconum contains the following headings: equivocation
(which means the various meanings of the word "serpent"),
synonyms and etymologies, differences, form and description,
anatomy, nature and habits, temperament, coitus and generation,
voice, movements, places, diet, physiognomy, antipathy, empathy,
modes of capture, death and wounds caused by the serpent, fables,
emblems and symbols, proverbs, simulacra and statues, dietary
uses, medical uses,
--to give only a partial list.^® The specifics
to be known comprised essentially all the various contexts in which
"serpents" were encountered in experience and 1 iterature—from
the dinner table to fables and dreams.
In attempting to account for the manifold categories for
consideration appearing the in pre-modern writings on natural
history, Foucault argues that this phenomenon can not be
20
explained by saying "science was hesitating between a rational
vocation and the vast weight of naive tradition, but for the
much more precise and constraining reason that signs were then
pert of things themselves, whereas In the seventeenth century
they become modes of representation."^^
This needs to be further explained. Foucault argues that
by the early 17th century. Western thought had undergone a
profound transformation with respect to the nature of the objects
of the world and the language which had previously determined
them. Words and signs are no longer Inseparable from the essence
of things themselves; now they merely report on, or represent,
things. Foucault says:
Language is no longer one of the figurations of the
world, or a signature stamped upon things since thebeginning of time. The manifestation and sign of
truth are to be found in evident and distinct
perception. It is the task of words to translate that
truth if they can; but they no longer have the right
to be considered a mark of it. Language has withdrawn
from the midst of beings themselves and entered a
period of transparency and neutral ity. 52
This passage may conjure up the image of Descartes, whose "clear
and distinct" perceptions were to serve him as the source of the
truth of the world. But the understanding that correct perception
is the basis of knowledge about things, and that language, at its best,
transparently reproduces the perceptual mental representation of these
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things, was not at this time unique to Descartes. In fact, Foucault's
point is that the intellectual primacy of direct perception, and a
conception of language consistent with this orientation, were
central to the spirit of the age. For instance, Hobbes says
li^h'ob^ecrworL^^o^'ihe lye^Trcs" an"o?h"
The role of language is simply to "transfer our mental discourse
54into verbal." For Hobbes, and his contemporaries, language simply
serves to convey the thoughts given by perception: words are names
designating objects and qualities-in sentences they reproduce the per-
ceptual representations, and so take the form of propositions. Thus
the primary structure of language is the statement of the general
form, "This is that."
The intellectual orientation emerging in the 17th century in which
men s experience of the world is mediated by representations--mental
and verbal
-represents some new problems. Foucault discusses one such
problem: "from the seventeenth century, one began to ask how a sign
could be linked to what it signified!'^^ The connection between the
(
posited duality of minds and bodies became a question. One was forced
to ask, "how are these representations, in here, related to those
things, out there?" Thus from the 17th century on, epistemology
became the predominant philosophical area of inquiry, and skepticism
the logical conclusion. Furthermore, when we consider Hobbes' claim
that, "these words 'true', 'truth', and 'true proposition', are
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equivalent to one another; for truth consists in speech, and not in
the things spoken of," ® we may come to recognize in the intellectual
orientation of the first centuries of the modern era something bearing
a strong resemblance to that constellation of understandings and
experiences earlier partially characterized by "truth as correctness."
Foucault attempts to illustrate what he takes to be the spirit of
this age by means of the 17th century painting Las Heninas
. by Velas-
quez (see illustration #1). i„ the foreground is an entourage sur-
rounding the Infanta Margarita, who looks straight ahead of her. Off
to the left of the Infanta is Velasquez himself; having stepped back
momentarily, he surveys his work. In the background a man looks on
from the steps behind an open door. But also in the background on
the far wall hangs a mirror: in the mirror we see the reflection of
two people standing in front of the depicted scene-King Philip IV
and Queen Mariana. It is they whom the depicted artist is portraying.
It is due to their presence that the Infanta and entourage are
assembled. And it is for them and their gaze that the work is executed.
But there is something odd about this scene. When the royal
couple view the representation of that world which they inhabit, they
nowhere find themselves. All they see of themselves is a reflection,
and this reflection is strangely isolated from all else that inhabits
that world: for the mirror is located behind the other figures, yet
their images are excluded from the reflection. In this representation
of the world of the intended spectators, the spectators see a mere
reflection of themselves--one which denies their relation to the
Other beings of their world.
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ILLUSTRATION #1
24
Thus Foucault suggestively presents the situation of early
modern subjectivity, a situation in .any respects with us today. While
Foucault does not hi.self explicitly raise the issue, one need not
dig too deeply into the writings of 17th and 18th century philosophers
to uncover evidence of the impulse to set straight non-phi losophical
thought and practices, which was previously here associated with "truth
as correctness." Hume, for instance, seeks to put right not only
"false philosophy", but also what the vulgar, in its "common and
careless way of thinking"®^ imagines itself to perceive.
In fact the characteristic form of philosophical insight for
many thinkers of the age was, "strictly speaking (really), things
are not as they seem when loosely speaking-i
.e.
, as we ordinarily
speak. Thus. Hobbes "discovers" that "there is nothing without us
(really) which we call an image of colour. Furthermore, the basis
upon which Hobbes attempts to construct his syllogisms is the
definition": that which "gives an universal notion of the thing
defined, representing a certain universal picture thereof... to the
mind." By means of exhaustive lists of such definitions, Hobbes
sets out to correct the usages of others, and to put the speech and
thought of his society on a more sure and stable footing. And
neither is this corrective impulse particular to Hobbes, nor confined
to purely philosophical speech and thought. For Hobbes, and for
numerous other intellectuals the impulse to arrange and order social
and political life is evident. It is the impulse of "reform"--! .e.
,
change from the (intellectual) top down.
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According to Foocaolt, the philosophical predominance of the
thought in which
“representation" plays a central role comes to a
close at the end of the 18th century. Clearly the transformation of
a people's intellectual character or orientation does not come about
all at once or absolutely. As Michael Oakeshott suggests, ways of
thinking change like styles of architecture; undeniably, but often
gradually and imperceptably.“ However, a function of philosophy
is to give expression to thought and experience which otherwise remains
inarticulate within the culture; thus when we view the works of
great philosophers, we often see the transitions in intellectual
orientation as if in bold relief. One important thinker who both
conceived of this particular understanding of philosophy, and of
himself as the intellectual expression of a new age to be constrasted
with the earlier era characterized by "representation", is Hegel.
In one of Hegel's principal works, the Phenomenology of Spirit ,
he attempts to trace the progression of consciousness from what we
might call "mere consciousness"--somethi
ng like what a baby, or
animal, might have--to a fully realized self-consciousness and self-
awareness. In fact, the Phenomenology
, which presents the path of
this progression to the consciousness of its reader, itself thus
constitutes "the end" and summation of this process of self-realiza-
tion: consciousness, reflecting on its own historical development,
finally arrives at the place it now occupies--that of reflecting upon
its own reflecting. However, for our purposes here, it will be enough
to excerpt a few stages from the phenomenological progression, and to
outline certain tendencies in Hegel's thought.
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Especially in the earlier stages, the progression appears
essentially ambiguous, and can be interpreted on different levels
The description of primitive consciousness and its unfolding can be
construed at times as referring to either the history of the individual
beginning in infancy, or of the human species "acquiring culture."
Moreover, aside from providing any sort of descriptive historical
account, these episodes perhaps primarily constitute an expose of that
way of thinking characterized by "representation".
The first book of the Phenomenology is entitled "Consciousness";
the first chapter, "Sense of Certainty". As Hegel describes sense
certainty, it is the sensually given experience of a consciousness or
mind, which experiences itself as generally continuous with, and
undifferentiated from, its surroundings. A developmental psychologist
might liken sense certainty to the experience of an infant who has not
yet formed "ego boundaries". A general parallel with the ancient
pre-phi losophic world-orientation is perhaps obvious as well.
In sense certainty the sensually given impressions are not
organized into "concepts" which could be used to perceive the world
as consisting of distinct objects and entities. Sense certainty is
the passive absorption of particulate sensations. For this reason one
might say that this is the truest experience of the world, since in it
the real contents of the world are presented to consciousness
immediately--"unfi 1 tered" by concepts. Thus, Hegel says.
Because of its concrete content, sense certainty immediately
appears as the richest kind of knowledge, indeed a knowledge
of infinite wealth for which no bounds can be found...
Moreover, sense certainty appears to be the truest knowledge;
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However. Hegel then imagines sense certainty asked to give an
account of its "knowledge”, to describe this truest experience of the
world itself. But because this experience is completely particulate,
sense certainty is unable to formulate its experience for itself or
for others. For to do so would require the use of properties or
"universals" to organize and subsume the sense impressions. All that
sense certainly is able to manage is to utter the words "This", "Here",
or "Now", as if pointing to its head and saying, "What is happening
there, at this time,
--that is what I know!"
In this way the experience which at first appeared to be the
richest and most true, e^xpresses itself as "mere being", as an
undefined general existence. Furthermore, even by just using the
words "This", "Here", "Now", sense certainly falsifies its experience.
For according to Hegel, these words too are universals which subsume
the particulars of sense certainty into the duration and extention
which define the "mere being". Hegel explains.
Of course we do not envisage the universal This or Being in
general, but we utter the universal; in other words we do
not strictly say what in this sense certainty we mean to say.
But language, as we see, is the more truthful; in it, we
ourselves directly refute what we mean to say, and since the
universal is the true [content] of sense certainty and language
expresses this true [content] alone, it is just not possible for
us ever to say, or express in words, a sensuous being that we
mean.o2
In the preface to his Philosophy of Right
,
Hegel makes the famous
statement, "What is rational is actual and what is actual is
6 3
rational." In the above context this suggests that the sensual
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experience which cannot be formulated or given expression must remain
a private subjective certainty which cannot be tested, or brought to
light and examined, and so rendered Vational" and "actual".
Thus, Hegel says, "What is called the unutterable is nothing else than
the untrue, the irrational, what is merely meant [but is not actually
expressed], On the other hand, for Hegel, what is rational and
actually expressed is the universal-which then emerges as the truth
of sense certainty. And because the truth of consciousness is now the
universal, experience is no longer immediate and passive, but rather
mediated by that movement of the mind which negates the particulars as
such, subsuming them into univorsdls.
The portrayal of sense certainty appears to allude to various
aspects of ancient Greek thought. For instance, putting the demand to
sense certainty to explicitly formulate and say that knowledge which it
claims to possess, is reminiscent of what Socrates' philosophy was to
Athens. In both cases self-consciousness is introduced by means of
"the universal". However, if taken too literally, the historical
parallels can be misleading. Pre-phi losophi c , and probably pre-Homeric,
thought did not consist of some kind of "raw particulate sense-data":
what Ionian and Socratic philosophy subsumed was not "sense-data", but
other concepts in their language.
Even interpreted as a description of early child development, the
account of sense certainty may be misleading. For even a newborn
probably does not just passively and indifferently receive impressions
which are then subsumed as the baby develops. But while the account
of sense certainty may not correspond to anything ever experienced by
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actual human beings, it may still be of heuristic value. Perhaps it
'S most useful to think of Hegel's beginning point as rather like that
of some of the "social contract" theorists: not so much a historical
description as a device for better understanding our present thought
and experience.®^ Seen in t-hic n„k<- np this light "sense certainty" appears as a
critique or expose of a theory of knowledge earlier discussed,
according to which the mind is an instrument which reflects the
objects of the world, and language functions as "a neutral and trans-
parent" conveyance. Considered in this way, the unfolding of sense
certainty can be taken as a demonstration of the bankruptcy of a
theory of knowledge connected with "representation".
In the subsequent stage of the phenomenological progression,
consciousness has shed the skin of sense certainty, and now takes on
the form of a consciousness "perceiving things". At the stage of
perception", both consciousness and its object are defined by the act
of subsuming in accordance with an ordering principle. By means of
the universal, or defining principle, the demarcation between self and
world first comes to consciousness, and thus for Hegel, becomes
actual
:
With the emergence of the principle, the two moments which
in their appearing merely occur
,
also come into being: one
being the movement of pointing-out or the act of perceiving,
the other being the same movement as a simple event or the
object perceived . 66
Consciousness now does not passively receive sensory impulses,
but actively subsumes them under a universal, according to a principle.
As a result, the experience of perception is not the meaningless
flurry of sense impressions as before: "perception is no longer
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something Which just happens to us like sense certainty; on the
contrary it is logically necessitated. Perception is organized
according to the structure of concepts and language.
The logically necessitated movement of consciousness which
replaces the nhis" of sense certainty is now a rthingV The Thing of
perception is itself a universal, to which may be referred other
universals as properties. Thus, for instance, we may describe a grain
of salt by attributing to it whiteness, hardness, a cubical shape, a
certain weight, etc.
However, when perceiving consciousness reflects upon the nature of
Its object, the Thing, it is beset with the following problem: is the
Thing itself a unity, or a mul tipi ici ty-a collection of properties.
Perception tries to make sense of this quandry; for instance at one
point it thinks that the Thing itself must be a unity, and only
appears multiple because of our own multiplicity. In other words, it
considers the Thing as one, but as appearing multiple because ^ hear
it, see it, feel it, etc. However, this reasoning does not hold up.
For perception discovers that as long as a Thing is itself something
determinate--can be distinguished from other things--it itself must
consist of properties which differentiate it.^^
And so perception struggles: looking first at its object, then at
itself, and then back again, claiming unity at one moment, and multi-
plicity the next--never reconciling the two. Finally, as
occurred in sense certainty, the object of consciousness ceases to be
one of two "moments" from which consciousness moves back and forth, and
becomes instead that very movement. The object is now "Force": the
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relation or movement between univensals. Consciousness is now
constituted not as perception, but as "understanding".
As with the account of sense certainty, that of perception can be
interpreted as a critique and expose of early modern thought. The
oscillations of perception strongly resemble some of the philosophical
problems of the 17th and 18th centuries. For example, in his 2nd
Meditation Descartes contemplates the sensible qualities of a ball of
wax, which all change when he melts the wax. Hence Descartes concludes,
that i^^^ythe wax is "neither that softness of honey, nor that
pleasant^scent of flowers, nor that whiteness, nor that shape, nor that
sound, but rather an immaterial substance. On the other hand.
Bishop Berkeley says that others
will have it that the word "die" denotes a subject or substance
predicated of it, and in which they exist. This I cannotcomprehend; to me a die seems to be nothing distinc???™ thosethings which are termed its modes or accidents. 70
Eventually the phenomenological progression arrives at the point
which explicitly corresponds to the intellectual life of the early
modern era. Here consciousness is constituted as "Observing Reason."
Observing Reason begins in the era of Descartes, who discovers
indubitable certainty in the existence of his self-referring thought:
if he simply thinks he exists, he thereby guarantees the fact of his
existence. Thus Hegel notes that Observing Reason differs from all
previous phenomenological stages of consciousness. Earlier forms of
individuality sought to wrest an independent existence from their
formative surroundings: even in their resistance they were defined
by their interaction with a world beyond themselves. However, with the
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advent of Reason, consciousness defines itself as an unshakeably stable
certainty without reference to a world in which it lives. In Hegelian
language. Reason is "the first EositiyUy in which self-consciousness
Jts own self expliriti^/ for itself.
Consciousness which experiences and understands itself as
existing detached from the world thus requires a different sort of
education from that previously required. In this regard. Hegel
contrasts what was needed of philosophy in antiquity,
-distance from
the immediacy of experience by means of the universal and reflection--
with what is needed of it in modernity:
The task nowadays consists not so much in purging theindividual of an immediate, sensuous mode of apprehension
a^d St"th
substance that is an object of thoughtn that thinks, but rather in just the opposite, in freeingdeterminant thoughts from their fixity so as to ^'ve actLlityto the universal and to impart to it spiritual life. 72 ^
In this regard Charles Taylor has attempted to explicate Hegel's
discussion of perceiving consciousness. Taylor takes this discussion
to be an expose of a "contemplative" theory of experience that is in
Its modern form derived from empiricism and cartesianism, and which
conceives of experience "as consisting of the passive reception of
sense data, so that the nature of experience itself is not bound up
with the way we interact and deal with the world. This "contempla-
tive understanding of experience essentially imposes or projects a
particular experience of the thinker qua thinker upon the whole of
learning and living in the world, and has consequently run up against
a number of problems, historically, one of which has been the com-
prehension of a "Thing" and its properties.
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As a n«ber of modern intellectual movements have tried to show,
our understanding and knowledge of something is generally not given by
Observation and contemplation, but by our embodied interaction with
the stuff of the world. Thus, for instance, the concept of a thing
integrating a number of properties may result from activity including
scraping off some surface, and thus effecting an object's shape and
size, and possibly the color, taste, smell, and texture as well.
However, this in itself does not really solve tte question that perception
was posing, i.e.: "What is the thing?-a multiplicity merely synthe-
sized by consciousness, or a unity apprehended diversely, or something
else?" Futhermore, the use of a "Thing" as an example of something to
be known is itself misleading: for the basis of most of what we know
IS not the seeing, sniffing, and scratching of objects, but speaking
and acting with other members of our cultural community. Some first
steps towards understanding in what ways, and to what extent, what we
know and who we are derive from our practices and membership in a
culture, are shown in the stage which follows Observing Reason--
"Active Reason".
At the stage of Active Reason, consciousness abandons trying to
find meaning ready-made by means of observation, and instead seeks, so
to speak, to put its stamp on the world", by means of action. Most
of the details of this stage need not concern us here, but the general
upshot of the section is of the utmost importance. As Taylor notes,
this section essentially divides the entire work in two parts. In a
discussion clearly pointing a critical finger at Kant, the acting
individual here discovers that his own "sound Reason and intelligent
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insight" are not sufficient to determine ethical conduct. According
to Hegel any legislation which is merely the product of an individual's
Reason is a "tyrannical insolence which makes caprice into a law and
ethical behavior into obedience to such caprice.
Pies of this sort entail no force of compulsion or obligation. These
Hegel contrasts with what he calls
"commandments"-laws issuing from
the ethical principles of a community, which precede the individual,
and are simply given by the culture. Concerning these laws Hegel says,
it is not a commandment, which only ought to be: it is and is
valid." Furthermore, Hegel argues that obedience to the existent
law is
not the serving of a master whose commandments were arbitrary
consciousness] would not rLogn^Litse f On the contrary, laws are the thoughts of its own
absolute consciousness, thoughts which are immediately its own. '77
This is to say that, for instance, the members of our culture
generally do not refrain from infanticide because of the vigilance of
some external authority, but because of who they are, and what they
think; and who they are, and what they think, are largely products of
cultural membership. Thus what emerges from the stage of active Reason
is an understanding of how fully the individual is wrapped up in,
dependent upon, and determined by his place within a culture.
Indeed, Hegel's understanding that the philosopher like anyone
else is fundamentally conditioned and bound by his cultural environ-
ment leads him to formulate a philosophical approach distanct from that
which sought to correct ordinary worldly experience and usage.
Hegel's philosophy is not meant to correct those experiences and
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usages, but rather to make explicit and conscious, what in them is
^Plicit and unconscious: his philosophy is that "owl of Minerva
Which flies only at dusk." As such, this philosophy recognizes a
dependence on the worldly thought and activity within society and cul-
tuTG to providG its "matGrial."
This understanding dictates the structure of the Phenomenology
.
The discussions of each stage of consciousness are not meant to be
critiques of that stage, so much as exposes-what are now sometimes
known as "imminent critiques." That is, the various stages of con-
sciousness are not subjected to the criticisms which occur to us, who
are presumably at some "higher " stage. Rather, each discussion is
supposed to merely describe how this mode of consciousness becomes
unworkable for Usejf. The criticisms evolve from within the given
consciousness. Hegel says,
we do not need to import criteria, or make use of ourown bright Ideas and thoughts during the course of theinquiry; It is precisely when we leave these aside that we
and^for itse?^?^^^^^'^^
That is, for example, only when philosophers cease "inventing",
are they then able to discover the already existing criteria implicit
and actually determinate for himself and others within the culture.
Kant described his insight that the truth of objects is to be
found by consideration of our sensual intuition, as a sort of second
Copernican revol ution--the analogy being that in both cases events are
explained by reconsideration of the vantage of the spectator. It may
not be stretching things too far to say that Hegel's thinking
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represents a kind of third Copernican revolution. For here, in order
to continue with fruitful philosophical inquiry, the philosopher is
forced to intellectually resituate himself as a member of an historical
communuy-sharing with others a non-philosophical existence involving,
among other things, a common language and pattern of interactions,
which fundamentally shape and govern his thought and being.
By introducing self-conscious consideration of the place of the
philosopher in the way he did, Hegel opened a door for later
thi nkers
.
CHAPTER IV
discussion III
one
.odern philosopher often compared with Hegel is Wittgenstein
On the other hand. Erich Heller lihens Wittgenstein to Nietzsche, on
account of their shared conception of their thinking as representing a
new and destructive force in the established world of thought. Just as
Nietzsche described hi.self as dynamite for the world of his contempor-
aries. so Wittgenstein undertakes to initiate an intellectual revolution
which will shake Western thought as its foundations. Heller relates that
Wittgenstein "felt as though he were writing for people who would think
in a quite different way. breathe a different air of life from that of
present day men; for people of a different culture.
Like Socrates, Hegel, and a number of other philosophers, Wittgen-
stein seeks not so much to instruct us, as to reveal us to ourselves.
However, the way in which Wittgenstein envisions the task of self-con-
sciousness differs greatly from his predecessors. For instance, for
both Socrates and Hegel, knowledge which could not give a verbal account
of itself did not deserve the name "knowledge". As Hegel puts it, such
"knowledge" is not actual, but "merely meant". In contrast, Wittgen-
stein asks us to compare knowing and saying the following:
how many feet high Mont Blanc is--
how the word "game" is used--
how a clarinet sounds.
He then remarks, "If you are surprised that someone can know
something and not be able to say it, you are perhaps thinking of a
case like the first. Certainly not one like the third. ,82
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replacement, "how is the word '
Aga,„ Wittgenstein differs fron, Socrates, Hege,
.
and
.uch of the
rest Of the Western intellectual tradition, as to the for. which philo-
sophical knowledge is expected to take. Since Socrates it has become
axiomatic that the answers to questions of the kind, "What is the nature
Wittgenstein's more "down to earth" suggested
used?") take the form of a princi-
pie which unites the concept's various instances. As Socrates insists.
"1 did not ask you to tell me one or two of all the many pious actions
that there are; I want to know what is characteristic of piety which
makes all pious actions pious.
But let us turn, with Wittgenstein, to the second example he gave
of knowing, and examine the nature of games:
proceedings that we call "games" I meanboard-games, card-games, ball
-games, Olympic games, and so onWhat IS common to them allT-Don't say: "There must be slethinacommon, or they would not be called •games-"-but look and seewhether there is anything common to call.
-For if you look atthem you will not see something that is common to all, but similar-ities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that To
look;-Lock for example at boa^d-jLs.
with their multifarious relationships. Now pass to card-gaLs;here you find many correspondences with the first group, but many
common features drop out, and others appear. When we pass next toball-pmes, much that is common is retained, but much is lost.—
Are they all 'amusing'? Compare chess with noughts and crosses.
Or IS there always winning and losing, or competition between
players? Think of patience. In ball games there is winning and
losing; but when a child throws his ball at the wall and catches
it again, this feature has disappeared. Look at the parts played
by skill and luck; and at the difference between skill in chess
and skill in tennis. Think now of games like ring-a-ring-a-roses
here is the element of amusement, but how many other characteris-
tic features have disappeared! And we can go through the many,
many other groups of games in the same way; can see how
similarities crop up and disappear. 83
Hence Wittgenstein describes concepts as functioning not by means
of a common defining principle, but like a thread which holds together
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not because there is one fiber which runs throughout the whole, but
because there is an overlapping and twisting of o„e fi,er upon another^^
In th,s way the var,ous occas,ons of a concept's use for. a criss-
crossing network constituting what Wittgenstein calls a "family
resemblance." We learn concepts by having experience with these differ-
ent instances of their use. Andfromthe theoretical point ofview, thereis
nothing else to be known. Thus, while we can of course criticize and
reject inappropriate uses of a concept, philosophy does not have a leg
to stand on in criticizing the established instances of use in general:
It simply is the conscious expression of our more or less established
behavior in these instances.
A number of recent philosophers are at one with Wittgenstein in
holding that much of our knowledge is not entirely governed by rules
and principles.®® In fact, they argue practical knowledge or "know-
how" could not even survive a translation into an explicit formulation
or system of rules. It is precisely the unsystematic or "open-ended"
character of such knowledge which allows us to project it into always
differing circumstances, and thus makes it of use. A rule or system of
rules could not accomplish what this "less defined", tacit, experential
knowledge allows us to do. Hence the Wittgensteinian philosopher must
not only abandon instructing the ordinary cultural norms of speech and
action, but also the Hegelian role of bestowing rationality and
actuality on the as of yet incomplete, since merely implicit, cultural
life of his community. Wittgenstein writes that philosophy, "leaves
everything as it is"
--except, as his commentators have hastened to
add, our understanding.
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Earlier th,s essay we have spoken of an intellectual perspective
wh,ch conceives of convention, or custo.-that which defines and unites
a co™unaty-as something to be escaped, if one is to reach the truth of
things. However, Wittgenstein understands social conventions, and in
particular, language, to be more than a set of constructs imposed upon
our independently existing identities and world. He holds language to
be in many cases fundamentally bound up with our selves, and our world.
We are used to thinking that the world is what it is, despite what
we or anybody else call it. But on further examination, this is not
always so clear. For instance, according to Benjamin Lee Whorf, there
is in the Hopi language no word corresponding to our notion of time as
a uniform continuous duration. "Time" for the Hopis varies from person
to person, does not admit of simultaneity, nor of plurality: the Hopi
do not say, "I stayed five days," but "I left on the fifth day." Hopi
verbs have no tense, but always indicate what sort of certainty the
speaker intends his statement to have: whether he is reporting an
event, expecting an event, or making a generalization about events.
Apparently the Hopi understanding of "time" is as consistent and
coherent as our own, and they have no experience that something is
lacking in it. So what is "time" independent of a language and cul-
ture? (If you are still tempted to suppose that there is something
existing "out there" that Indo-European and Hopi "time" concepts each
only capture an aspect of, perhaps you will be less so inclined after
the final section of this paper.)
If language can be seen to be largely determinant in certain
cases taken from the natural world, so much the more so with examples
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-volv ,„9 the cultural world. For instance. Hanna Pitkin notes that
because three different German words are translated by the single
English word
"representation", for the English speaker, unlike the
German speaker, "the way a painting or a painter or an actor
represents' is part of the same concept as the way an agent or a
Congressman ' represents What reDrpqpnt;^f-!m • ^wn i presentation is depends on what
role the word
"representation" plays in a language.
Hence an investigation into language need not be "merely about
words"-but about the world too. Wittgenstein says. "Grammar tells
what kind of object anything is. "5° What grammar-the conditions
for words' appropriate use-tells us is in many cases not all that is
to be known about something. But when we do philosophy, and inquire
concerning things' essence or nature, we are in fact asking questions
about our language, whether we are aware of it or not.
The fact that what anything's essence is, is specified by "mere
conventions" in a language does not mean that the world is "arbitrary'
that we could change things' meanings if we just decided and agreed
to. At one point Wittgenstein introduces the question whether human
agreement determines what things are. He answers himself that what
determines is "not agreement in opinions but in forms of life."^^
What Wittgenstein is saying is that the conventions which govern what
our words mean are rooted in the matrix of our cultural practices--
what we do, and hence, who we are (this will be further explained).
To change one would be to change the others, and we are not entirely
at liberty to change any of these (could you just "choose" to think
and see the world like a Hopi?).
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Just as we are not entirely at liberty to alter or reject what
has been given to us in the common possession of a language, so too
IS a thinker or Dhilo'^nnhpr -hn ^ iP e a large extent bound by the everyday
conventions of his culture. And unless he recognizes, and is atten-
tive to, this fact, he will risk misunderstanding both himself and
h's subject matter. For instance, Pitkin cites and discusses Robert
Dahl's essay, "The Concept of Power." m this essay Dahl seeks to
uncover and explicate the underlying idea of a number of concepts
including influence, control, and authority. According to Dahl,
what underlies these concepts is "power": the ability to get others
to do things they would not otherwise do-and Dahl suggests that he
will use all these notions essentially interchangeably.
However, Pitkin shows that words such as "power" and "influence"
are not really interchangeable. As she demonstrates, we speak of
"indirect power", but not "indirect influence"; one can have "the
power of (attorney, the sword, the purse)", but not "the influence of
(anything)," and so on. Moreover, Pitkin points out that in spite of
himself, Dahl does not go on to use the terms interchangeably: his
thought and speech continues to be guided by the distinctions given by
his language. Thus he does not speak of Senators' "power" over the
Senate, but of their "influence."®^
Pitkin explains that in truth these terms are not even strictly
comparable: they work in quite different ways, "move in different
dimensions. Pitkin notes that "[t]he social science literature
is full of attempts either to distinguish them in simple ways, or to
make one of them into a sub-category of the other." However, all
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such attempts fan to grasp the complex ways in which such concepts
are actually determined and distinguished. Consequently, while these
thinkers' conclusions point one way. they themselves continue in
"Other-directed by the regularities and distinctions existing in the
language and culture of which they are inescapably a part.
Hannah Arendt occupied a place in the forefront of modern
Philosophers who stress the thinker's need to understand his or her
cultural membership. It is perhaps then a testament to the difficulty
of escaping certain implications of our language and philosophical
habits of thought, that this great theorist did not always see where
and how to look, to do just this. In combating
"reductionist" ways of
understanding human conduct, Arendt describes "action" as a uniquely
human phenomenon, requiring distinct intellectual treatment.^®
However, Pitkin suggests that this is not so; we use the word "action"
not only with respect to humans, but also with respect to animals,
and even inanimate matter, as when we speak of the action of water on
sandstone cliffs. So action is not something "distinctively human",
and Arendt was wrong in saying it is.^^
What is startling about Pitkin's criticism is that it says little
that anyone, including Arendt, did not already know. It would be
clear to most any competent English speaker that Arendt is using
"action" in a way different from ordinary speech. What might not be
immediately obvious is that this matters: that in discussing the
nature of action Arendt is bound by the ordinary uses of that term,
and related words, as these uses are established in the language. But
it is these uses which tell us what kind of thing action is. Or, in
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the words (if not exactly the deeds)
aside our bright ideas do we "succeed
it is in and for itself.
of Hegel, only when we leave
in contemplating the matter as
Finally we return to an idea which Wittgenstein calls “one of the
great sources of philosophical bewi Idermenf^S-the idea that the
truth of a concept is its correspondence to a referent. According
to his view words serve as labels for things, and when assembled into
sequences form propositions which describe and assert. It was earlier
here suggested that this view constitutes an imposition or projection
of characteristically philosophic or scientific activity upon the mani
fold and varied practices of a culture. Thus Wittgenstein calls our
attention to the variety of linguistic practices, or what he calls
"language games", in our culture:
Reivew the multiplicity of language-games in the following
examples, and in others:
Giving orders, and obeying them--
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its
measurements--
Constructing an object from a description (a drawinq)--
Reporting an event--
Speculating about an event--
Forming and testing a hypothesis--
Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and
diagrams--
Making up a story; and reading it--
Play-acti ng--
Singing catches--
Guessing riddles--
Making a joke; telling it--
Solving a problem in practical arithmetic--
Translating from one language into another--
Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying--
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Wittgenstein follows thic: i.-c-t- -^ulist with the comment that it is
0
. ana sentences,
--
--
...t
...cians
..e saia atcnt
.e stnnctnne ot
^
-- P--sop.ens
.a.e tnaaUtona„.
fa, lea to necognize the United scope of the labelling on nefenning
function of language because of their "unduly narrow focus
for Clearly "Hello" does not refer to anything. Or,
.ore significantly.
the sentence "George is coding for a visit"
.ay refer to George (as
a response to the question,
"Will you be seeing George?"); but it may
not refer at all. but id^ George (as a response to the guestioh.
"Who is coming to visit?"). 103
^he point here is that it will be
^possible to uhderstand the nature of our concepts and language
without a more perspicacious view of words' uses in the different
contexts in which we actually learn and use them.
But doing this, and overcoming the generalized conception of the
labelling function of language is not simply a matter of unlearning a
mistake made by philosophers of antiquity and passed down from
generation to generation within the discipline. For us, as for those
ancient philosophers, the confusion here results from implications of
our language which mislead us when we undertake reflection and
philosophy. Wittgenstein says, "A picture held us captive. And
we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language
seemed to repeat it to us inexorably
.
How then are we to escape this picture, inexorably given us by
our language? For one thing, Wittgenstein suggests we replace our
customary inquiry, "What is the meaning of which may
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lead us to presuppose the general referring function of language
("a word's meaning is the thing it refers to"), with the question
"How is the word '
. ,,coh?mused? Wittgenstein likens the words
of our language to a collection of different tools in a toolbox:'"’^
we might say that there are labels in the box, but much more too.
He also compares words to handles in a locomotive cabin:
ped.r’But oie1r?he^hanr
an effect only so long as it is moved to and fro^lOb
Wittgenstein attempts to illustrate how words can function by
means of an example of what he asks us to imagine as a complete primi-
tive language. The entire language consists of four words: "block",
"slab", "pillar", and "beam"-and serves as a means of communication
between a builder and an assistant. When the builder needs something,
he calls out one of these words, and the assistant brings the appro-
priate object. What, then, in this language can the call "slab!"
be said to mean or refer to?
Perhaps we are inclined to think, as Wittgenstein once thought,
that the call corresponds to a certain idea or image which somehow
passes before the mind when spoken or understood. But for the builder
or assistant, what passes before the mind may be "I hope this will
fit
,
or "Where is that no good assistant?", or most anything else;
in any case it would not necessarily tell us anything about the call
"slab!". And supposing that the image or meaning must then be present
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to the mind subconsciously is as Pitkin understates
"not „ n ,J 08
, .
, very help-
magine Wittgenstein's language game except with the
assistant replaced by a trained dog, and the calls replaced with
Claps: one, two, three, or four. What is the meaning or image which
a single clap consciously, or subconsciously, presents to the dog's
mind? Wouldn't we do better here to think of the clap, call, or
Similar command in our own language, as a kind of "signal" which
people (usually people) learn to use and respond to as part of a
certain activity?
Pitkin introduces the conception of language as "signals" and
for doing things, not just labels for referring, by means of
J.L. Austin's notion of "performatives". Austin observes that
certain verbs in the first person are not used to describe or refer,
but to perform the action which they name. Thus to say, "I promise"
(under proper conditions) is not to describe a promise, but to make
one. As Austin explored his notion of performatives, he came to find
that such functions are quite widespread. For instance one need not
say "I promise" to make a promise; one could say "OK", "you bet", or
most anything under appropriate circumstances Thus while some
words will more commonly occur in a performative linguistic environ-
ment--words such as "accusing", "honoring", "accepting", "toasting",
etc.
--most any words can be used to perform actions and so may be
performative to greater or lesser extents.
Once we have begun to grasp that words do more than label and
describe, we will question whether substantives are always used to
name things, and verbs to name activities. One particular confusion
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which we may now avoid is the presupposition that verbs which do not
name physical activities must then name
.'mental activities or states"
It may seem to us almost beyond doubt that '.thinking...
..meaning"
Veading",
"remembering", etc., are mental activities. But this is
rarely the case.
Consider an example Wittgenstein gives in order to demonstrate
the grammar of "meaning". He describes a scene in which one person
instructs another to write out the series
.2, which the second person
does up to 1000. But at this point he continues the series 1000, 1004,
1008, etc. Consequently, the first person corrects him, saying that
’
he IS not acting as he was meant to. Wittgenstein now asks the first
person if when he instructed the other if he meant that 1002 should
follow 1000, and also that 1868 follow 1866, and 100036 follow
100034, and "an infinite number of such propositions?"!" Eventually
the imaginary interlocutor responds. "But I already knew, at the time
when I gave the order, that he ought to write 1002 after 1000."^^^
To which Wittgenstein answers, "Certainly, and you can also say that
you meant it then; only you should not let yourself be misled by the
grammar of the words "know" and "mean".^^^ For Wittgenstein argues
that "meaning" is used here not to describe a particular mental
experience, activity, or state, but rather to make the claim that "If
I had been asked what number should be written after 1000, I should
have replied '1002'
Similarly, Pitkin, again leaning on Austin, explains the grammar
of "knowing":
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o?'m-nd;'we'L'°aUrmah state
Saying we feel quite sure Lv Hp^ k commitment,
saying we know does more than thatIt means issuing a certain kind f^ething different,
kind of responsibility for the truth ^ certainWhen I say, "I know^^ give "thers mfwnrf T •my author! tv for say-ieT thit I th li ? !^’ ^ others[th^tfm;? I have SliiBTTknow
Hence knowing is not something like a stronger version of
believing. And if the word knowing" were to disappear from our
language, it might not mean that we would be any less able to
describe our mental states; but it might indicate that we would have
lost the cultural practice of giving our authority to others to act
upon.
If we fail to understand Wittgenstein here, than knowing,
meaning, etc. will appear as mysterious "inner processes", which
others must perhaps only infer from our outer behavior. But a
Wittgensteinian understanding may help to show us that with respect
to these concepts we are not necessarily enigmas to each other. In
fact, in many respects Wittgenstein's thinking implies a reformulation
of problems of intellectual isolation from others and the world--
problems of philosophical skepticism, subjectivism and relativism.
However, for the purposes of this essay, it will be enough to explore
how Wittgensteinian philosophy can clarify one area of our language
in this respect.
If we simply assumed that words are labels, and if we then
witnessed occasions of their labeling, we might conclude that we had
thus observed the words' meanings. Hence in certain social
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conditions we might be led to sav "• 4.-y that justice is the interest of the
stronger" (Thrasy.achus)”."6
(Hobbes). in fact something like this perspective is entrenched in
the positivistic common sense of the social sciences. According to
this perspective, statements about the world can be exhaustively
divided between those of "fact" and those of "value". The former are
considered as descriptions or assertions in principle verifiable by
observable evidence like any scientific claim. The latter, while
sometimes appearing similar to the former, actually merely express
subjective preferences; consequently, they cannot be verified, nor
serve as the basis of any rational discussion or conclusions.
However, the category of words and statements "expressing value"
is in fact a mixed bag, united only by their non-membership in the
category of "facts". And such a categorization may obscure important
differences among these "value words". For instance words such as
"just" or "good" differ from words which actually are generally used
to express preferences and tastes, such as "pleasant" or "delicious",
in that the former can be used to invoke standards. It is the exis-
tence of more or less established standards within our language which
allows us to make claims which are based not only on our likes and
di si i kes--al 1 ow us to speak, as Kant said, in the "universal voice.
Thus while one can legitimately support the statement "Canary wine
is pleasant" by saying, "Well, I like it," one cannot so defend a
statement that it is "good". To follow a claim that a wine is good
(a work of art is beautiful, an action is just, etc.) with the state-
ment, "Well, I like it," is not a defense, but a retreat. Similarly,
51
while it makes sense in the fi rc:t ra +.w rst case to say,
"Well, it is so to
me. It does not in the latter case(s).”9
The defense of claims i.p,yi„g standards requires knowledge of
the subject and what will qualify as legitimate and relevant appeals
to those standards. And not everyone has the knowledge, and thus the
authority, to make any such claim. In order to authoritatively claim
that, for instance, a dive was good-not just exciting, say-one has
to know something about divingJ^O
knowledgeable and
initiated will not always agree in their judgements, they generally do
agree as to what are relevant concerns. Hence, in diving, the
straightness of entry into the water is a relevant criteria; the speed
of entry is not. What is to be a legitimate standard is sometimes
itself a matter of debate, but as Pitkin says, "not just anything you
do will be challenging standards, not just any challenge will be a
proposal for new standards. We already have, as it were, some implicit
notions of what will count as. ..a new application of a familiar
concept." For to appropriately invoke words implying standards,
we must be able to reasonably connect our present application with the
previously established and implicit standards.
In order to comprehend the logic and rationality of the various
areas of human conduct and language, one must see how in fact they
do operate-not simply judge according to criteria from other regions
of our culture. Again, as Pitkin says:
The fact that we speak differently about art than about
physical events is notproof that esthetic discourse is
less objective than scientific discourse. On the contrary,
we need to look and see how objectivity functions, what it
52
what tationality^^retMcs"'i'ooks''l1l<*^*'^'' understand
What Pitkin and Wittgenstein show is that if our thought is really
to grapple with the self and world it intends to reflect upon, we must
recognize that we can only do so from a position not above or outside,
but within a culture. Language, and the consequent notions we
developed concerning reflection, directed us elsewhere. Our conception
of meaning as a universal principal led us to hypestatize a theoretical
knowledge which both transcended, and served to definitively
"rule and
measure", ordinary practical knowledge. Our understanding of conven-
tion led us to consider the cultural and the "real" as necessarily
opposed. And our notion that words represent things led us to see our
relationship to the world as perpetually contemplative,
"intellectual",
and one step removed, when in fact it is often immediate because
actively engaged in the manifold practices of a culture. Furthermore,
this particular perspective led us to disparage the sphere of action
for then not conforming to the standards of the sphere of observation
and analysis. For these and other reasons, the philosopher, who, as
such, undertakes a particular and distinctive human practice, has need
of finding his place amongst others participating in various different
practices, many of which he shares with them. Philosophy is needing
to teach itself how to see, in Wittgenstein's words, "from close
to.
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Moreover, despite the fact that the human subject of this essay
has been almost exclusively "the philosopher", the relevance of the
undGrs tandi ngs discussGd Iigtg GxtGnds bGyond thG livGS of profGSSGd
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Phnosophers. Our culture 1s increasingly one of social Isolation,
reflection, and self-consciousness. Camus dramatically portrays this
experience with a scene from the life of the modern Individual:
"A man
IS talking on the telephone behind a glass partition; you cannot hear
him, but you see his Incomprehensible dumb show: you wonder why he Is
alive."
Clearly rethinking our concepts will not abolish modern self-
estrangement and cultural alienation. But our concepts can distort our
perception somewhat like Camus' glass partition: making the world seem
foreign and nonsensical In ways It really is not. For either the
philosopher or the reflective individual, what a rethinking of reflec-
tion may offer is a more clear understanding of how and what we share
in a cultural community, and what in truth divides us.
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